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Abstract: 
 We investigate the socio-economic determinants of mortgage delinquency in 12 
EU countries and observe that income volatility significantly increases the mortgage 
delinquency risk. This pattern even holds for borrowers with higher-income profiles if 
volatility in income is high enough. From this result we can draw the following 
conclusions: i) mortgage protection insurance policies might be failing to cover those 
borrowers most in need; ii) the existence of credit market imperfections, and; iii) the 
inability for a number of borrowers most at income risk to accumulate precautionary 
savings in order to meet mortgage payments when shocks in income arise. 
 
 
JEL classification: D1, R0, J0 
Keywords: Income volatility, mortgage delinquency, mortgage insurance, 
homeownership, payment-to-income ratio, credit market imperfections, precautionary 
savings. 
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1. Introduction 
 During the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s the rates of mortgage 
delinquency have fallen dramatically in most of the EU-151 countries. These downward 
trends coincide with falling interest rates and improving performances in most of the 
EU-15 economies. Paradoxically, this decline in the mortgage delinquency rates has 
also coincided with upward trends in the prices of housing, which in countries as 
Ireland, Spain, UK or The Netherlands has been dramatic. Besides the favorable 
economic conditions mentioned above, a greater effort by the lending industry to make 
mortgage take-up more affordable has been necessary to mitigate such a dramatic 
increase in housing prices. 
 Despite the decline in mortgage delinquency rates, this phenomenon still exist and 
raises issues not only for lenders but also for borrowers. For the former group, apart 
form the obvious well documented economic losses that a default would suppose, there 
are some studies that report health problems associated with the unsustainable housing 
and the mortgage arrears (see e.g. Burrows, 1998; Nettleton and Burrows, 1998, in the 
UK; Berry et al., 1999, in Australia; Doling and Ruonavaara, 1996, in Finland).  
 In tandem with the upward trends in mortgage take-up there exist a growing 
industry devoted to providing safety-nets to mortgage borrowers via the same lending 
institutions or insurance companies. The objective of the mortgage insurance policies is 
to counteract the potentially devastating effect of the unforeseen events that cause 
fluctuations in the mortgagor’s income. Therefore, in the event of involuntary 
unemployment, sickness or other unexpected shock in the mortgagor’s income, the 
mortgage payment is covered. However, the growing literature in this issue, mainly 
                                                 
1 We refer to EU-15 as the 15 EU countries before the extension to 25 countries executed in May-2004. 
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focused on the UK mortgage market, provide evidence on the inefficiency and 
inadequateness of the private mortgage protection insurance (MPI) policies in both the 
low take-up from those borrowers most at income risk and the poor coverage of the 
risks (see Pryce and Keoghan, 2002; Ford and Quilgars, 2001).  
 In this paper we examine the determinants of mortgage delinquency in 12 of the 
EU-15 countries. We focus on the socio-economic factors rather than those regarding 
the characteristics of the mortgage or the mortgaged property. In this context, we 
believe that volatility in household’s income is the variable that, in a risky world, best 
proxies the wide range of unforeseen events that might cause mortgage delinquency or 
mortgage arrears. Additionally, other socio-economic factors such as different types of 
employment, unemployment and income are considered. 
 To some extent, we believe that examining the effect of all these factors on the 
residential mortgage delinquency risk is also a plausible test on the performance of the 
mortgage insurance industry, the potential existence of capital market imperfections, or 
the (in)ability of those households most at income risk to accumulate precautionary 
savings to meet the mortgage payments when a shock in income arises. On the one 
hand, an efficient mortgage insurance market would be that capable of removing the 
effect of most of these factors from the mortgage delinquency propensities by providing 
both a suitable coverage of the risk as well as covering those most in need. On the other 
hand, in the absence of a mortgage insurance households susceptible to experience 
shocks in income are supposed to save from positive shocks to face the negative ones, 
or to borrow if there exist a perfect capital market. Under this scenario we should expect 
income volatility to exert an insignificant effect on the likelihood of mortgage 
delinquency once we control for the level of income. 
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 Traditionally, the econometric analysis of the determinants of the probability of 
mortgage delinquency or default has been carried out using the standard logit or probit 
model. However, if the previous tenure choice process is not accounted for, estimates 
coming from this model are biased. To solve this we estimate a bivariate model with 
sample selection where both the homeownership and mortgage delinquency propensities 
are considered simultaneously. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 offers and overview of the literature 
on mortgage delinquency and default In section 3 we briefly discuss some of the main 
determinants of mortgage delinquency. In section 4 we describe the dataset and the 
empirical framework. Section 5 shows our main findings. And section 6 summarizes 
and concludes.  
 
2. Overview of the literature: Mortgage delinquency, default and insurance 
 The literature on mortgage delinquency is quite scarce and most of the studies 
focus on mortgage default. However, given that mortgage delinquency in itself usually 
is the precursor of the ultimate default, it seems interesting to study this aspect of the 
mortgage market. Also most of the previous studies focus on the characteristics of the 
mortgage and the mortgaged property as the determinants of default, and leave 
borrower’s socio-economic characteristics as a residual element. Two studies that 
explicitly examine mortgage delinquency in the US are Green and Furstenberg (1975) 
and Springer and Waller (1993). The first observed that in neighborhoods with 
increasing black population the propensity for mortgage delinquency is higher. The 
second focused on the lender’s side and examined the factors determining the timing of 
the lender’s foreclosure decision with delinquent mortgages. They observed that the 
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duration of the delinquency period and the final lender’s foreclosure decision depend on 
the borrower’s equity position. Anderson and VanderHoff (1999) also focused on the 
borrower’s race and observed that black mortgagors are more likely to default.  
 Also in the context of the US housing market Kau and Keenan (1999) studied the 
probability of mortgage default and the severity loss of this default, and observed that 
the distribution of the default severity is critical in determining the borrower’s decision 
to default. Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) examined the likelihood of mortgage default 
using US individual loan history data. These authors observed that both the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio and the difference between the market value of the mortgaged 
property and the par value of the mortgage are positively related to the probability of 
default, and surprisingly, the payment-to-income (PTI) ratio is negatively related. They 
justify such a striking result by arguing that higher PTI ratios are associated with 
borrowers who have ample additional resources to overcome a default. Deng et al. 
(1996) also found evidence of the relevance of the LTV ratio on the probability of 
mortgage default. They also observed that unforeseen situations as unemployment and 
divorce act as trigger events on the probability of default. Ross (2000) studied default 
propensities controlling for the sample selection caused by the approval process 
previous to the mortgage take-up. 
Outside the US the number of studies examining the determinants of the mortgage 
default risk are more limited. Chinloy (1995) treats default as a three stage sequential 
process, initial delinquency, long-term non-payment and ultimate default. He applied 
this multistate mortgage default model to the UK and found that income and liquidity 
constraints determine the borrower’s decision to keep a mortgage even when the home 
equity becomes negative. Eichholtz (1995) investigated the effect of regional economic 
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stability in the regional rates of default in the Netherlands. This author concludes that 
the regional employment characteristics are good predictors of the regional levels of 
mortgage default.  
 The literature on mortgage insurance is rapidly growing, though there are still 
relatively few theoretical studies. Brueckner (1985) constructed a two-period model to 
analyze the borrower’s choice of the optimal time pattern of mortgage payments 
assuming future house values as uncertain. The amount of the premium will depend on 
the riskiness of the mortgage and the initial down payment. Pryce (2002) developed a 
theoretical model of the mortgage protection insurance decision taking into account the 
welfare system and the consumption lost in favor of the insurance premiums. 
 There are many more empirical studies, though most of them focus on the UK 
mortgage market. All of these studies emphasize the inadequateness and the failure of 
the MPI policies. Pryce and Keoghan (2001, 2002) and Ford and Quilgars (2001) found 
evidence that the main consumers of such an insurance policies were not those 
borrowers most at income risk. Burchardt and Hill (1997, 1998) found that MPI-holders 
did not have significantly greater unemployment risks than the uninsured mortgagors. 
Ford et al. (1995) indeed found that only a quarter of the insured mortgagors in arrears 
tried to claim. Kempson et al. (1999) observed that those borrowers with unstable work 
histories and ill-health are systematically precluded from being eligible for the MPI 
policies. 
 
3. The determinants of mortgage delinquency  
 Mortgage delinquency represents a relevant problem to lenders. As mentioned 
earlier, though mortgage delinquency does not systematically lead to a default, 
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undoubtedly it tends to be the precursor of the ultimate default. Hence, the determinants 
of the initial delinquency will also influence the final mortgage default. However, 
analyzing the probability of default is somewhat more complicated since the foreclosure 
process can be systematically delayed because of government regulations or the lenders 
voluntarily allowing the lengthen of the delinquency period. Although variables such as 
the LTV ratio is one of the primary factors affecting the risk of default and hence also 
the initial mortgage delinquency, in this study we rather focus more on the borrower’s 
socio-economic factors. The mortgagor’s level of income and the variables determining 
this income (occupation, education, the type of employment, etc.) are expected to exert 
a significant effect on the mortgage delinquency risk.  
 As mentioned earlier, in a perfect world were households do not face borrowing 
constraints or can save during positive shocks to meet the negative ones, we should 
expect income volatility to have an insignificant effect on mortgage delinquency once 
we control for income level. However, the previous international empirical evidence on 
these issues does not allow us to admit the existence of “such a perfect world”. One the 
one hand, the existence of credit market imperfections is well documented. For instance, 
Jappelli and Pagano (1989) observed for a selected group of OECD countries (Sweden, 
USA, UK, Japan, Italy, Spain and Greece) that the sensitivity of consumption to current 
income fluctuations was very high. They found this result to be caused by the existence 
of capital market imperfections. On the other hand, contradicting the precautionary 
motive for savings assumed in the theoretical literature, there exist little empirical 
evidence supporting that wealth accumulation and savings arise as a precaution against 
future income risk. (Guiso et al. ,2002, in Italy; Arrondel ,2002, in France; Skinner 
,1988, and Lusardi ,1998, in the US). In this context, we believe that income volatility, 
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rather than income level, might be more suitable for capturing the borrower’s ability to 
face the periodical mortgage payments. Therefore, we focus on this variable as the main 
determinant of mortgage delinquency.  
 Unexpected situations such as involuntary unemployment or job mobility, 
sickness, demand shocks or any other unforeseen event that cause fluctuations in 
household’s income may also raise the risk of mortgage delinquency. To capture these 
effects we consider the unemployment history of the household head during the last 5 
years previous to the survey and his/her self-reported health status during last 12 months 
previous to the survey. As mentioned above, in order to avoid mortgage delinquency all 
these risks might be covered by the mortgagor’s own financial resources. Therefore, we 
also test the role of savings as a determinant of mortgage delinquency.  
 Additionally to the LTV ratio, the loan-to-income (LTI) ratio is also an important 
determinant of mortgage delinquency risk. Clearly, if the LTV and LTI ratios are too 
high this may significantly affect the paying capacity of the borrower. However, the 
effect of these variables can be smoothed throughout time by contracting a mortgage 
with longer duration. This would be the case of some northwestern EU countries as 
Denmark or The Netherlands where high LTV (above 80-90 percent) and high LTI 
(above 3) ratios are combined with longer mortgage durations (30-35 years). These 
figures contrast with other EU countries as Italy, Belgium or Austria whit LTV ratios 
bellow 50 percent and LTI values bellow 1 combined with mortgage durations that 
range form the 10-15 years in Italy to the 15-20 years in Belgium or Austria2. Therefore, 
since the a loan with a given size might become more affordable with a longer payment 
period, the payment-to-income (PTI) ratio is probably the variable that best measures 
                                                 
2 See Neuteboom (2003) for an extensive analysis of the risks associated to the LTV and LTI ratios in a 
selected group of EU countries.  
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the extent to which the mortgagor’s paying capacity is affected by the size of the loan. 
In our study we will also consider the PTI ratio as one of the determinants of the 
mortgage delinquency risk. 
 Finally, as in other previous studies in the US, we also consider two additional 
variables expected to be important determinants of the probability of mortgage 
delinquency. These are the characteristics of the mortgagor’s neighborhood3 and the age 
of the mortgage. As it is pointed out in Green and Fustenberg (1975), assuming the 
mortgagors “good faith” when taking-up a mortgage, it would be expected that 
mortgagors try to avoid mortgage delinquency at least during the firsts years but with 
increasing probability at a given point in time. This behavior may be collected by means 
of a quadratic function on the age of the mortgage. 
 
4. Data and empirical framework 
4.1. Data 
The data comes from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a 
yearly panel of the EU-15 countries that started in 1994 and that was carried out during 
8 consecutive waves. In this paper we use all waves, thus covering the period 1994-
2001 for 12 of the EU-15 countries. Germany and Sweden are omitted from the analysis 
since for these countries the question regarding mortgage delinquency provides only 
missing values. We also omit Greece since the number of non-response to this question 
is remarkably high.  
                                                 
3 See Green and von Furstenberg (1975) and Anderson and VanderHoff (1999) for further discussion. 
These authors emphasize in the racial component of the mortgage delinquency and default. Ross and 
Tootell (2004) also analyzed the neighborhood racial component influencing the lender’s treatment of the 
mortgage applications.  
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The ECHP contain information not only at household, but also at individual level. 
The household characteristics that we consider relevant for the present study are the 
household size and composition, demographic characteristics, income and 
accommodation. The accommodation questions provide information about the type of 
dwelling, the year when the household acquired the dwelling, and the motives for 
dwelling mobility. The survey also includes a set of questions regarding the financial 
situation of the household. More specifically, our indicator of mortgage delinquency is 
constructed using to the following question: Has the household been unable to pay 
scheduled mortgage payments during the last 12 months?. 
Besides household information, we also use personal information (age, gender, 
etc.) and individual socio-economic characteristics (employment status, earnings, 
education, etc.). In order to keep the samples representative at a country level, 
households that leave the panel are randomly replaced. To carry out our analysis we 
impose and obvious restriction on our sample, i.e. homeowners must have outstanding 
mortgage payments. Since the number of mortgage delinquents per wave is relatively 
low, for our econometric estimates on the probability of mortgage delinquency we pool 
all available waves for each country. Hence, each wave is treated as a cross-section. We 
follow this procedure in order to have enough mortgage delinquents to obtain 
meaningful estimates on the determinants of mortgage delinquency.  
In figure 1 we show the evolution of the mortgage delinquency rates in the US, the 
EU-15 and separated trends for the 12 EU countries considered in our analysis. 
Although there is a common decreasing pattern in most of the countries, there are 
marked differences among them. Austria, The Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Luxembourg 
and Portugal have shown low rates of mortgage delinquency, bellow 2 percent. A 
 11
second group composed by France, Belgium, Italy, Ireland and Spain show delinquency 
rates ranging from near 3 percent to 6 percent. Finally, Finland is the country with the 
highest rate of mortgage delinquency among the studied countries, above 10 percent. 
The evolution of the mortgage delinquency rates in the EU-15 contrasts with the 
patterns observed in the US, where it is observed an increasing trend during the same 
period. In 1994 the mortgage delinquency rate in the US was about 4.2 percent, whereas 
for the UE it was about 5.5 percent. In 2001, this pattern reversed and in the US the rate 
rose to near 5.5 percent, while in the UE-15 the rate felt up to 2.5 percent. It would be 
interesting to compare these figures with the rates of mortgage insurance take-up, but 
unfortunately this information is not available in our dataset. 
 
Insert figure 1 around here 
 
4.2. Empirical model 
 The observed endogenous variable in our econometric model, yit, is binary, 
taking the value one if the household i was unable to pay the scheduled mortgage 
payments during the 12 months previous to the survey at period t and 0 otherwise. In 
this context, yit, is the realization of the unobserved propensity for mortgage delinquency 
for each household, y*it. Hence, the econometric specification can be written as  
 
* '( 0) ( 0) ( 1,..., )it it it ity I y I X i Nβ ε= > = + > = , (1)
 
where I(•) is a binary indicator function that takes one if the argument is true and zero 
otherwise, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the vector of coefficients to be 
estimated, and εit is the error term. Usually, Eq. (1) is estimated by means of the pooled 
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probit model, or the random effects probit model if we add the assumption that the error 
term in (1) can be additively decomposed as εit=αi+νit, where αi is a time-constant 
household effect and νit is time-varying white noise error. The pooled probit model (1) 
has the unattractive feature that cannot identify the unobserved heterogeneity across 
households (αi). However, in contrast with the random effects model this model is 
capable of identifying state dependence parameters even when the assumption of strict 
exogeneity is violated. It is also shown that the pooled probit model provides consistent 
estimates and under conditions performs so well as the random effects probit model (see 
Diaz-Serrano, 2004a).  
 When one estimates the probability of mortgage delinquency across homeowners, 
this propensity cannot be observed if the individual is a renter. Thus, our model consists 
in two simultaneous equations and can be expressed as follows 
 
* '( 0) ( 0) ( 1,..., )it it it ith I h I Z e i Nγ= > = + > =  
* '( 0) ( 0) ( 1,..., )it it it ity I y I X i Nβ ε= > = + > =  
(2)
 
where hit* is the latent variable indicating the propensity to be homeowner, and yit*  is 
the latent indicator regarding the propensity to be mortgage delinquent for household i 
at period t, respectively, and ( , )it ite ε ~ (0,0,1,1, )BVN ρ . The matrixes Zit and Xit do not 
need to contain the same variables. In this context, if we do not control for the home 
tenure selection process, as we do in Eq. (2), the standard pooled probit model 
expressed in (1) provides biased estimates. 
According to Eq. (2) we face both a censoring and observation rule for both hit and 
yit, which lead us to consider the sample selection issue. Hence, we need to control for 
correlation between the error terms and the sequence of choices. For each mortgage 
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delinquency outcome we have three types of observation: being homeowner; being 
mortgage delinquent; and not being mortgage delinquent. This selection rule provides 
the following likelihood function: 
 
( )
2
1
1
2
1 0
0
log ( , , )
log ( , , ) log 1 ( ) ,
it
it
it it
it
it it
h
y
it it it
h h
y
LogL Z X
Z X Z t
γ β ρ
γ β ρ γ
=
=
= =
=
= Φ +
+ Φ − − + −Φ ∀
∑
∑ ∑  
(3)
 
where Φ and Φ2 denote the univariate and bivariate standard normal cumulative 
distribution functions, respectively.  
 
4.3. Variable definition 
 As mentioned earlier, in this paper we will study the determinants of mortgage 
delinquency paying especial attention to the effect of household’s income volatility. As 
in Haurin (1991) we will proxy income volatility as the coefficient of variation (CV) of 
the net annual household income over time. He used the CV to evaluate the effect of 
income uncertainty on the homeownership propensities in the US. In our study we 
assume this variable to play a role in both the homeownership and mortgage 
delinquency equation. 
 The matrix X in the mortgage delinquency equation in (2) contains a set of 
household characteristics, i.e. income volatility (CV), annual net household income, 
household size, a squared polynomial on the age of the mortgage4, a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if the household could save during the last 12 months previous to the 
                                                 
4 Our dataset does not include precise information on the age of the mortgage. However, we know the 
year when each homeowner moves to his/her current dwelling. We find this variable is a plausible proxy 
of the age of the mortgage. 
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survey, and a dummy variable indicating whether there is vandalism or crime in the 
area; and a set of household head characteristics, i.e. a squared polynomial on age, 
gender, marital status, a set of dummies for education, self-employment, public 
employment, a dummy variable indicating whether the household head was unemployed 
at least once during the last five years prior to the survey, and a dummy taking 1 if the 
household head reported bad health during the last 12 months previous to the survey. 
 In the homeownership equation the matrix Z contains the same variables than the 
X in the mortgage delinquency equation, except the age of the mortgage, plus a set of 
dummies collecting the occupation of the household head and a dummy variable 
indicating whether the household occupied the current dwelling because of job mobility. 
Additionally, we also carry out separate estimates of Eq. (2) including the PTI ratio as 
an explanatory variable in the mortgage delinquency equation. Table 1 shows a sample 
means summary of the variables used in this study. 
 
Insert table 1 around here 
 
5. Results 
 In table 2 we report summary statistics of the estimated household income 
volatility (CV) by homeownership status and by mortgage delinquency. A first look 
allows us to conclude that in all counties our key variable possesses enough variability 
to look for effects on both the homeownership and the mortgage delinquency equation. 
The southern European countries (Spain, Italy and Portugal) and the UK report higher 
levels of household’s income volatility than the northern and central European 
countries. We observe that in most of the countries renters tend to have more volatile 
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incomes than homeowners, and only in Ireland and Austria are the levels of income 
volatility similar between both tenure types. Marked differences are also observed in 
most of the countries concerning the levels of household income volatility between 
mortgage delinquents and non-delinquents. Except in France and Finland, income 
volatility tends to be substantially larger for mortgage delinquents. These results suggest 
that both the homeownership and mortgage delinquency patterns might be influenced by 
this variable.  
 
Insert table 2 around here 
 
 Table 3 reports the econometric estimation of the bivariate probit with sample 
selection on mortgage delinquency. Recall that given the nonlinear nature of the 
econometric model, the estimated coefficients lack of any economic interpretation and 
are just used to determine the direction of the relationship. However, since we are not 
interested in comparing the magnitude of the estimated effects across countries, the sign 
and significance of the estimated coefficients are enough to draw our conclusions. It is 
worth noting that except for Belgium, the correlation between both equations is highly 
significant ( 0ρ ≠ ). This result indicates that controlling for sample selection is critical 
to obtain unbiased estimates in the mortgage delinquency equation. 
 For the sake of simplicity we will focus on the estimates concerning the variables 
we consider as important determinants of the mortgage protection insurance take-up. 
These variables indicate which households are most at income risk, and hence most in 
need of the MPI. These are household income, income volatility, savings, household’s 
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head unemployment history and his/her self-reported health status. We assess 
significance at 5 percent. 
 As expected, household income is highly significant in both the homeownership 
and the mortgage delinquency equation, and with the expected sign in all countries. Our 
key variable, income volatility, turns out to be significant in both the homeownership 
and the mortgage delinquency propensities for most of the countries. We observe a 
negative effect on homeownership5 and a positive one on mortgage delinquency. 
Exceptions to this general result are Portugal and Austria where the effect on 
homeownership is insignificant, Luxembourg where the effect on mortgage delinquency 
is insignificant, and Ireland with an insignificant effect on both the homeownership and 
the mortgage delinquency propensities.  
Household heads that were unemployed at least once during the five years before 
the survey also shows a significant negative effect on homeownership, and positive on 
mortgage delinquency in most of the countries. An insignificant effect on 
homeownership is only observed in Spain and Luxembourg, while an insignificant 
effect on mortgage delinquency is observed in the UK, Portugal and Luxembourg. The 
self-reported bad-health of the household head also reveals itself as an important 
variable, though in Ireland, Spain and Austria the effect is not significant in either the 
homeownership or mortgage delinquency equations, and not significant for Belgium in 
the mortgage delinquency equation. We observe that in all countries the variable 
savings exerts a significant negative effect on the probability of mortgage delinquency, 
while the effect is positive on homeownership for all countries except for France, Italy 
and Finland. 
                                                 
5 This result coincides with the previous empirical evidence analyzing the effect of income uncertainty on 
the probability of homeownership (Haurin, 1991; Robst et al., 1999, in the US; Diaz-Serrano, 2004a, in 
Germany and Spain; Diaz-Serrano, 2004b, in Italy). 
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 Consistent with the previous evidence in the US, we also observe that in “bad 
neighborhoods”, proxied as the existence of crime or vandalism, homeownership is less 
likely and there exist a greater propensity for mortgage delinquency. However, in 
contrast with what Green and Furstenberg (1975) observed, we find little evidence than 
mortgage delinquency is less likely in the earlier years of the mortgage take-up and with 
increasing probability at later stages. This effect is only observed in Belgium, while the 
opposite holds for Denmark, Luxembourg, UK, Ireland and Finland. In the rest of 
countries the effect of the age of the mortgage on the mortgage delinquency risk has 
turn out to be unimportant.  
 
Insert table 3 around here 
 
 We have also carried out separate estimates of our bivariate probit model with 
sample selection including the PTI ratio as explanatory variable in the mortgage 
delinquency equation. Results are reported in table 4. We follow this procedure in order 
to avoid the potential inconsistency that the endogenous nature of this variable might 
cause in our estimates. However, in all the countries examined these new estimates are 
similar to the ones shown in table 3 concerning the sign, the size and the significance of 
the other explanatory variables. In all countries except in Denmark, UK, Ireland and 
Austria, the PTI ratio exerts a significant and positive effect on the mortgage 
delinquency risk. This result contrasts Vendell and Thibodeau (1985) in the US, who 
observed the opposite. 
 
Insert table 4 around here 
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 Finally, we shall point out that for a suitable understanding of the effect of income 
volatility on both the homeownership and mortgage delinquency propensities, this 
variable should be related with the level of income itself. One may be tempted to 
associate more volatile incomes to low-income profiles, however, it is not necessarily 
true. There are a number of studies in the labor economics literature where the risk-
return trade-off in individuals’ income is well documented6. To test to what extent this 
finding fits our data, we have carried out regressions taking our measure of income 
volatility (CV) as the endogenous variable. The results are shown in table 5. 
After controlling for a number of factors we observe that more volatile incomes 
are associated to higher levels of income in all countries except in the UK and the 
southern EU countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal). This result is quite revealing since it 
indicates that higher-income profiles are also susceptible to incur in mortgage 
delinquency if the level of volatility in income is high enough. The countries were this 
pattern does not hold are those that reported the higher levels of income volatility (see 
table 2). 
 
Insert table 5 around here 
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 In this paper we examine the probability of mortgage delinquency in 12 EU 
countries. To avoid the bias caused by the homeownership selection process we use the 
bivariate probit model with sample selection. To examine the determinants of the 
mortgage delinquency risk we focus on the mortgagor’s socio-economic characteristics 
                                                 
6 King, 1975; McGoldrick (1995), Hartog and Vivejverg (2002), in the US and Hartog et. al. (2003), for a 
selected group of EU countries observed that more variable earnings distributions tend to possess also a 
higher mean. 
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rather than on the mortgaged property and the characteristics of the mortgage, as usual 
in the default risk literature. We pay special attention to those variables that are likely to 
cause shocks in the mortgagor’s income, and hence are also likely as determinants of 
the mortgage insurance take-up. Our key variable is household’s income volatility 
proxied as the coefficient of variation of net annual household income, which turns out 
to be crucial in explaining both the homeownership and the mortgage delinquency 
patterns. Other variables as unemployment, savings and the ill-health status of the 
household head also have significant effects. To some extent, one might find surprising 
that the same result persistently holds for such different countries in terms of both their 
housing and their mortgage markets7. However, it suggests that though there are marked 
differences among them, unsustainable homeownership and lender’s attitude towards 
the mortgage delinquency risk is a common element across most of the countries 
examined in this study.  
 The fact that income volatility significantly increases the mortgage delinquency 
risk suggests the existence of credit market imperfections and the low ability for those 
households most at income risk to accumulate precautionary savings. Hence, when a 
negative shock in income arise mortgage delinquents reacts reducing housing 
consumption if the size of shock is big enough. Additionally, the significance of the 
others factors listed above also suggests that MPI policies are not adequate in covering 
those households most in need or the range of risks covered. As observed in the UK, a 
larger propensity of a low-income mortgagor profile to be a mortgage delinquent 
suggests that probably for this population stratum the low MPI take-up is driven by the 
non-affordability of the premiums. However, in this paper we not only observe that 
                                                 
7 See Mercer Oliver Wyman’s (2003) report for an extensive analysis of the mortgage markets in a 
selected group of EU-15 countries. 
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income volatility increases significantly the probability of mortgage delinquency, but 
also that more volatile incomes are associated to higher-income profiles. This result 
suggests that even being affordable, the low MPI take-up from the borrowers with 
higher income-profiles and with larger income volatility is probably driven by the 
limited coverage of the risks associated with the mortgagor’s income. 
 Undoubtedly, both lenders and insurers are in business, therefore, efficiency and 
adequateness must be sacrificed for the sake of profitability. In the UK there is evidence 
that MPI premiums do rise during slumps and fall during booms (Goodman, 1998). And 
in Walker et al. (1995) there are listed a number of clauses in the MPI contracts that 
preclude a large number of claims. Hence, the number of events sensible to cause 
shocks in mortgagor’s income covered by MPI policies is certainly limited. Our results 
suggest that similar analyses for the EU countries examined here using MPI take-up 
data will probably provide the same findings. It seems that both insurers and lenders 
play more with mortgagor’s risk aversion than with his/her needs. Although this 
literature is growing, we find this issue is still under-researched. Given its importance 
and implications for both lenders and borrowers more research in these lines would be 
necessary. 
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Figure 1: Mortgage delinquency rates in the EU and the US (1994-2001) 
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Table 1: Sample means summary 
Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France UK Ireland Italy Spain Portugal Austria Finland
Mortgage delinquency 0.013 0.006 0.050 0.012 0.015 0.010 0.058 0.052 0.060 0.018 0.007 0.105
Homeownership 0.635 0.548 0.690 0.712 0.579 0.703 0.856 0.752 0.823 0.699 0.598 0.706
Ratio Mortage/Income 0.233 0.246 0.201 0.177 0.226 0.179 0.155 0.229 0.216 0.212 0.130 0.247
Income volatility (CV) 0.218 0.197 0.266 0.265 0.226 0.298 0.255 0.291 0.286 0.297 0.238 0.163
Annual net income* 
(Real 2001 €) 39,509 35,083 37,264 51,034 32,997 40,132 35,985 25,458 23,878 17,130 34,477 34,002
Household head 
Age 40.703 43.568 42.394 41.146 41.665 46.125 44.006 44.761 46.075 45.740 43.251 40.703
Secondary education 0.409 0.282 0.301 0.339 0.263 0.133 0.271 0.258 0.114 0.063 0.645 0.367
Higher education 0.292 0.124 0.296 0.166 0.189 0.362 0.135 0.074 0.150 0.052 0.071 0.290
Female 0.403 0.240 0.264 0.244 0.229 0.526 0.209 0.181 0.190 0.244 0.334 0.471
Self-employed 0.053 0.053 0.090 0.058 0.072 0.066 0.206 0.171 0.133 0.211 0.080 0.145
Public employee 0.223 0.160 0.145 0.147 0.159 0.120 0.155 0.158 0.102 0.116 0.146 0.198
Unemployed 
(during last 5 years) 0.265 0.112 0.155 0.007 0.106 0.172 0.156 0.112 0.210 0.089 0.131 0.260
Married 0.497 0.685 0.622 0.613 0.592 0.542 0.716 0.764 0.737 0.738 0.633 0.567
Household size 2.305 2.617 2.651 2.743 2.610 2.790 3.503 3.061 3.169 3.016 2.820 2.672
 27
Job mobility 0.030 0.017 0.014 0.004 0.045 0.048 0.006 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.033
Crime in the area 0.100 0.168 0.202 0.019 0.211 0.137 0.112 0.165 0.184 0.119 0.062 0.190
Age of the mortgage 10.372 11.451 11.226 11.155 10.222 9.567 13.605 13.119 13.356 13.637 13.791 9.556
Notes: (*) Values corrected for poverty thresholds. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for income volatility (CV) 
Total Renter Owner
No mortgage 
delinquency
Mortgage
delinquency
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Denmark 0.216 0.175 0.247 0.195 0.197 0.160 0.215 0.175 0.272 0.185
The Netherlands 0.192 0.208 0.210 0.218 0.178 0.197 0.192 0.208 0.283 0.198
Belgium 0.247 0.207 0.270 0.230 0.229 0.186 0.245 0.204 0.301 0.261
Luxembourg 0.219 0.187 0.232 0.203 0.208 0.171 0.219 0.187 0.246 0.148
France 0.228 0.215 0.246 0.220 0.204 0.206 0.228 0.216 0.218 0.168
UK 0.302 0.198 0.339 0.218 0.281 0.183 0.300 0.197 0.429 0.222
Ireland 0.250 0.164 0.252 0.182 0.250 0.158 0.249 0.164 0.284 0.168
Italy 0.279 0.219 0.293 0.230 0.253 0.194 0.277 0.218 0.370 0.263
Spain 0.291 0.215 0.299 0.221 0.284 0.210 0.287 0.213 0.402 0.250
Portugal 0.268 0.214 0.276 0.217 0.251 0.208 0.267 0.214 0.362 0.279
Austria 0.231 0.190 0.231 0.195 0.230 0.182 0.230 0.190 0.320 0.223
Finland 0.169 0.195 0.210 0.233 0.141 0.156 0.170 0.195 0.164 0.187
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Table 3: Estimates of the bivariate probit model with sample selection on the homeownership and mortgage delinquency propensities. 
 Denmark The Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg 
 Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. 
 Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. 
Constant term -1.685 -10.94 -2.704 -6.02 -2.269 -14.33 1.705 8.48 -4.126 -19.96 -2.880 -5.47 -4.591 -23.32 -3.099 -2.67 
Income volatility  -0.547 -7.45 0.661 3.81 -0.546 -11.27 0.602 11.89 -0.563 -7.56 0.636 4.59 -0.284 -3.56 0.285 1.44 
Household income/1000 0.195 9.99 -0.028 -1.27 0.265 93.31 -0.251 -37.73 0.137 9.59 -0.081 -3.65 0.071 7.77 -0.280 -6.55 
Savings 0.142 5.65 -0.717 -8.54 0.349 17.25 -0.465 -13.55 0.158 5.45 -0.719 -11.00 0.095 3.13 -0.713 -4.72 
Household size 0.149 8.93 0.007 0.20 0.096 9.49 -0.089 -8.21 0.159 11.36 0.093 3.97 0.202 14.28 0.099 3.02 
Job mobility -0.386 -5.89   -0.397 -5.51   -0.456 -5.14   -0.934 -4.16   
Crime in the area -0.510 -13.88 0.171 1.56 -0.387 -16.76 0.389 15.27 -0.212 -6.39 0.163 2.39 0.223 2.22 0.256 1.39 
Mortgage age   0.033 1.43   -0.004 -1.34   -0.073 -4.18   0.098 2.83 
Mortgage age squared   -0.002 -1.97   0.000 1.12   0.003 3.63   -0.005 -2.73 
Household head   
Age  0.051 10.82 0.021 1.23 0.076 14.13 -0.069 -10.29 0.174 19.17 0.052 2.21 0.152 19.13 0.079 1.59 
Age squared 0.000 -9.66 0.000 -1.17 -0.001 -18.46 0.001 13.28 -0.002 -19.63 0.000 -1.85 -0.001 -18.06 -0.001 -1.57 
Secondary education 0.195 6.75 -0.115 -1.23 0.408 12.53 -0.359 -10.55 0.266 8.01 -0.144 -2.23 0.383 11.15 0.029 0.30 
Higher education 0.257 7.25 0.054 0.57 0.701 17.60 -0.655 -16.06 0.175 4.60 -0.430 -5.79 0.149 2.92 -0.394 -1.54 
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Female -0.263 -10.82 -0.185 -2.24 -0.234 -9.33 0.225 8.00 -0.271 -7.69 0.252 2.93 0.157 3.88 0.133 0.85 
Self-employed 0.483 6.46 0.441 4.31 0.207 4.43 -0.138 -2.95 0.222 4.46 0.177 2.12 -0.082 -1.27 -0.387 -1.29 
Public employee 0.004 0.13 0.001 0.02 0.111 4.12 -0.117 -4.09 0.048 1.28 -0.037 -0.52 0.479 12.39 -0.493 -3.32 
Occupation dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Unemployed last 5 years -0.219 -7.92 0.274 3.61 -0.430 -15.36 0.426 14.34 -0.358 -10.79 0.145 2.06 0.217 1.61 -0.213 -0.74 
Bad Health -0.397 -9.20 0.470 3.44 -0.283 -6.53 0.301 5.32 -0.291 -4.53 0.053 0.42 -0.807 -13.58 0.480 2.60 
Married 0.577 19.50 -0.073 -0.21 0.355 11.98 -0.322 -6.19 0.496 13.27 -0.288 -4.82 0.243 5.86 -0.367 -2.41 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho  0.300   0.988   0.038   0.622 
Test rho=0 40.152  68.256   1.761 50.394 
Log-likelihood -8,738 -11,777  -7,011   -5,459 
Sample size 16,644   24,036  12,399    9,848 
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Table 3 (continuation) 
 France UK Ireland Italy 
 Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. 
 Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. 
Constant term -3.747 -31.78 -2.071 -4.23 -1.019 -4.64 -4.714 -5.51 -2.179 -10.58 -0.197 -0.65 -2.491 -17.17 -0.774 -2.27 
Income volatility  -0.330 -6.69 0.261 2.54 -0.390 -3.43 0.716 2.29 -0.098 -0.90 0.215 1.81 -0.304 -5.37 0.489 4.24 
Household income/1000 0.113 8.14 -0.138 -4.32 0.348 18.80 -0.164 -3.06 0.297 15.93 -0.172 -13.39 0.505 13.77 -0.138 -4.59 
Savings 0.008 0.677 -0.710 -8.00 0.379 9.65 -0.644 -4.21 0.213 5.22 -0.505 -9.46 -0.002 -0.06 -0.452 -5.85 
Household size 0.031 3.73 0.108 5.87 -0.050 -2.97 0.026 0.53 -0.136 -11.62 0.103 7.64 0.031 3.15 0.113 5.11 
Job mobility -0.787 -18.87   -0.622 -7.47   -0.749 -5.52   -0.463 -5.99   
Crime in the area -0.252 -12.03 0.281 5.86 -0.436 -8.26 0.129 0.63 -0.408 -10.14 0.294 5.98 -0.121 -4.55 0.186 3.48 
Mortgage age   -0.008 -0.56   0.091 2.00   0.023 1.93   0.018 1.25 
Mortgage age squared   0.001 1.48   -0.004 -1.68   -0.001 -2.26   -0.001 -1.02 
Household head   
Age  0.152 30.14 0.019 0.88 0.046 6.65 0.139 3.73 0.122 13.89 -0.038 -2.69 0.077 13.00 -0.033 -2.56 
Age squared -0.002 -29.79 0.000 -0.80 -0.001 -8.63 -0.002 -3.65 -0.001 -13.68 0.000 2.93 -0.001 -14.01 0.000 2.78 
Secondary education 0.185 8.46 -0.092 -1.79 0.275 4.60 -0.154 -0.79 0.328 8.55 -0.270 -6.30 0.288 10.98 -0.217 -4.14 
Higher education 0.108 3.40 -0.191 -2.69 0.217 4.70 -0.225 -1.44 0.394 6.30 -0.229 -3.38 0.122 2.57 -0.369 -3.40 
 32
Female -0.222 -8.11 0.163 2.11 -0.053 -1.33 -0.160 -1.12 -0.239 -5.39 0.273 5.00 -0.061 -1.63 0.189 2.43 
Self-employed 0.095 2.53 -0.053 -0.75 0.535 6.15 -0.037 -0.19 0.216 3.60 -0.019 -0.33 0.038 1.16 0.214 3.57 
Public employee -0.144 -6.31 0.014 0.25 0.178 2.79 -0.501 -1.96 0.130 2.65 -0.150 -2.84 0.035 1.23 -0.001 -0.02 
Occupation dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Unemployed last 5 years -0.369 -13.63 0.449 8.45 -0.179 -3.92 0.183 1.28 -0.523 -13.81 0.415 9.62 -0.249 -7.44 0.227 3.39 
Bad Health -0.165 -4.91 0.219 2.96 -0.339 -5.51 0.573 2.81 -0.098 -1.28 0.181 1.78 -0.139 -3.73 0.305 4.22 
Married 0.708 30.71 0.014 0.23 0.359 7.80 -0.151 -1.50 0.965 17.73 0.276 3.43 0.273 6.93 -0.190 -2.44 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho     0.568 -0.146  0.906     0.516 
Test rho=0 186.638  8.922 53.163 122.877 
Log-likelihood -15,027 -3,250 -4,061    -9,742 
Sample size  27,639  6,571  9,426    16,125 
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Table 3 (continuation) 
 Spain Portugal Austria Finland 
 Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. Ownership Mortage del. 
 Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. Coef. Z-val. 
Constant term -1.245 -8.57 -0.981 -3.29 -1.515 -10.79 -0.989 -2.04 -3.225 -18.38 -5.137 -3.51 -2.190 -11.07 -1.686 -5.26 
Income volatility  -0.247 -3.97 0.556 5.15 -0.103 -1.54 0.521 3.07 -0.103 -1.38 0.555 1.98 -0.331 -3.41 0.399 2.99 
Household income/1000 0.224 15.58 -0.244 -7.98 0.335 15.16 -0.205 -2.43 0.124 11.93 -0.254 -3.36 0.364 13.44 -0.154 -5.19 
Savings 1.133 42.09 -0.324 -5.86 -0.196 -5.07 -0.612 -2.25 0.135 4.60 -0.576 -3.94 -0.032 -0.84 -0.618 -9.34 
Household size   0.120 6.75 0.041 4.12 0.044 1.76 0.256 19.06 0.010 0.18 0.127 6.86 0.077 3.67 
Job mobility     -0.158 -1.90   -1.336 -7.22   -0.805 -8.49   
Crime in the area -0.637 -8.15 0.257 5.23 -0.060 -1.78 0.055 0.51 -0.615 -10.89 -0.298 -0.95 -0.460 -11.90 0.177 3.08 
Mortgage age   0.000 -0.03   0.010 0.46   0.024 0.50   0.048 3.37 
Mortgage age squared   0.001 0.79   -0.001 -0.75   -0.001 -0.60   -0.002 -2.87 
Household head   
Age  0.056 9.19 -0.022 -1.78 0.035 5.61 -0.030 -1.58 0.083 13.53 0.155 2.58 0.053 7.47 0.025 1.92 
Age squared -0.001 -12.05 0.000 1.84 -0.001 -8.28 0.000 2.35 -0.001 -13.47 -0.002 -2.85 -0.001 -6.98 0.000 -1.66 
Secondary education -0.086 -2.49 -0.179 -2.59 0.119 2.78 -0.098 -0.84 0.004 0.10 -0.203 -1.32 0.141 3.40 -0.220 -3.87 
Higher education -0.040 -1.04 -0.121 -1.66 0.062 0.87 -0.133 -0.60 -0.158 -2.62 0.494 2.32 0.355 6.79 -0.302 -4.58 
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Female 0.066 1.61 0.086 0.94 0.016 0.46 -0.117 -1.00 -0.009 -0.27 -0.112 -0.59 0.102 2.95 0.017 0.36 
Self-employed 0.102 2.83 0.068 1.12 0.320 8.64 -0.037 -0.36 0.018 0.28 0.176 1.00 0.210 3.30 0.066 0.96 
Public employee -0.043 -1.15 -0.232 -2.70 0.234 6.90 -0.127 -1.27 0.104 2.75 -0.083 -0.48 -0.028 -0.64 0.022 0.39 
Occupation dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Unemployed last 5 years -0.011 -0.38 0.208 3.96 -0.284 -7.82 -0.023 -0.18 -0.229 -5.97 0.515 3.41 -0.188 -5.17 0.240 4.76 
Bad Health 0.072 1.83 0.090 1.22 -0.156 -4.19 0.255 2.31 -0.088 -1.71 0.094 0.45 0.063 1.14 0.079 1.07 
Married 0.471 11.21 -0.037 -0.47 0.352 8.80 -0.105 -0.79 0.143 2.89 -0.137 -1.01 0.203 4.70 0.050 0.81 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho   0.435   0.548   0.191     0.640 
Test rho=0 84.217 68.884   9.661 154.357 
Log-likelihood  -8,834  -7,477  -6,301    -4,464 
Sample size  13,386  14,393 11,527     7,348 
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Table 4: Estimates of the bivariate probit model 
 Income volatility Payment-to-income 
 Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
Denmark 0.6537 3.75 0.0598 0.50 
The Netherlands 0.5906 9.19 0.0140 6.26 
Belgium 0.5771 4.02 0.6486 3.66 
Luxembourg 0.2121 1.02 0.5642 3.60 
France 0.2602 2.55 0.4946 2.71 
UK 0.6860 2.15 0.0854 1.12 
Ireland 0.2081 1.74 0.3233 1.73 
Italia 0.4758 3.88 0.4945 4.92 
Spain 0.5321 4.70 0.6507 5.99 
Portugal 0.5170 2.96 0.3530 3.22 
Austria 0.5512 1.96 0.0322 0.76 
Finland 0.3855 2.83 0.1839 3.00 
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Table 5: OLS estimation of the determinants of income volatility (endogenous variable: CV of household income). 
Denmark The Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France UK
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Constant 0.545 42.12 0.308 16.85 0.149 7.80 0.226 14.01 0.542 52.12 0.455 27.04
Household Income/104 0.090 11.62 0.163 19.96 0.074 13.23 0.075 11.51 0.103 20.44 -0.054 -5.23
Household size -0.027 -20.44 -0.005 -3.98 -0.014 -9.11 -0.005 -3.57 -0.012 -12.84 0.002 0.98
Age  -0.011 -21.71 -0.003 -5.45 0.004 5.62 0.002 3.21 -0.008 -20.68 -0.003 -4.98
Age squared 0.000 18.00 0.000 4.25 -0.000 -4.66 -0.000 -4.34 0.000 13.51 0.000 1.53
Secondary education 0.020 6.37 0.003 1.19 0.015 4.01 -0.013 -3.81 -0.024 -9.99 0.008 1.27
Higher education 0.020 5.41 -0.030 -7.25 -0.001 -0.24 -0.003 -0.57 0.000 0.13 0.004 0.92
Female 0.014 5.32 0.011 3.20 0.028 6.24 0.039 9.09 0.020 6.58 0.034 7.95
Self-employed 0.175 30.64 0.180 31.72 0.197 33.34 0.067 10.31 0.126 28.48 0.054 6.66
Public employee -0.018 -5.35 -0.025 -6.69 -0.047 -9.35 -0.019 -4.45 -0.052 -17.41 -0.011 -1.66
Professionals -0.030 -6.35 -0.038 -8.18 -0.028 -4.31 -0.037 -5.87 -0.050 -10.66 -0.033 -3.93
Technicians -0.024 -5.53 -0.044 -9.81 -0.020 -2.98 -0.023 -4.27 -0.051 -13.62 -0.068 -8.06
Clerks -0.034 -6.44 -0.015 -2.57 -0.030 -4.73 -0.015 -2.39 -0.041 -8.51 -0.034 -4.68
Services and sales -0.022 -3.83 0.002 0.30 -0.017 -1.98 -0.031 -4.16 -0.036 -6.56 -0.023 -3.11
Skilled primary sector 0.054 4.73 0.030 1.86 0.070 3.61 0.019 1.66 -0.020 -2.82 -0.014 -0.59
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Craft and trade -0.049 -9.09 -0.003 -0.65 -0.027 -3.76 -0.002 -0.32 -0.051 -13.57 -0.074 -8.05
Operators -0.035 -5.81 -0.033 -5.07 -0.050 -5.50 -0.031 -4.72 -0.060 -14.43 -0.078 -8.66
Unemployed 0.013 4.20 0.038 9.32 0.026 5.72 0.100 6.09 0.000 0.14 0.027 5.09
Married -0.015 -4.67 -0.038 -10.09 0.001 0.23 -0.015 -3.54 -0.022 -7.87 -0.048 -9.84
Crime in the area 0.010 2.38 0.003 1.05 -0.003 -0.65 0.125 12.44 0.002 0.83 0.037 6.55
Job mobility 0.065 9.01 0.021 2.14 0.030 2.29 0.085 3.66 0.057 11.65 0.036 3.84
R-squared 0.246 0.175 0.203 0.146 0.199 0.211 
Sample size 18,783 26,944 20,174 18,296 43,125 9,113 
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Table 5 (continuation) 
Ireland Italy Spain Portugal Austria Finland
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Constant 0.068 4.49 0.231 18.31 0.093 7.02 0.086 5.68 0.245 14.82 0.502 34.81
Household Income/104 0.025 9.37 -0.050 -20.10 -0.038 -4.33 -0.251 -15.59 0.029 3.16 -0.003 -0.28
Household size 0.004 4.48 0.015 17.42 0.020 24.54 0.010 10.56 0.001 0.95 -0.019 -12.44
Age  0.007 13.13 0.002 5.08 0.006 12.40 0.010 19.34 0.001 2.41 -0.009 -13.74
Age squared -0.000 -14.37 -0.000 -6.50 -0.000 -13.78 -0.000 -21.40 -0.000 -4.12 0.000 8.24
Secondary education 0.001 0.38 -0.022 -8.69 0.001 0.24 -0.005 -0.93 -0.008 -2.08 -0.002 -0.42
Higher education -0.010 -2.26 -0.009 -2.00 -0.009 -2.56 0.014 1.78 0.001 0.12 -0.022 -4.66
Female 0.021 5.75 0.023 6.71 0.010 2.69 0.012 3.10 0.005 1.42 -0.008 -2.28
Self-employed 0.112 26.48 0.156 53.91 0.199 65.19 0.124 34.70 0.160 23.38 0.097 16.78
Public employee -0.041 -10.74 -0.044 -14.87 -0.054 -14.44 -0.060 -14.37 -0.036 -7.72 -0.015 -3.24
Professionals -0.022 -3.67 -0.045 -7.89 -0.051 -9.39 -0.025 -2.64 -0.031 -3.18 -0.015 -2.45
Technicians -0.018 -3.04 -0.064 -13.98 -0.040 -8.37 -0.068 -10.36 -0.018 -3.04 -0.018 -3.10
Clerks -0.013 -1.95 -0.061 -15.39 -0.037 -6.34 -0.064 -9.38 -0.043 -6.47 -0.020 -2.72
Services and sales 0.015 2.28 -0.031 -7.03 -0.018 -3.79 -0.027 -5.03 -0.014 -2.17 -0.018 -2.56
Skilled primary sector -0.097 -18.43 -0.004 -0.68  0.019 4.12 0.012 1.26 0.018 2.18
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Craft and trade 0.009 1.81 -0.053 -15.62  -0.046 -10.83 -0.054 -9.48 -0.028 -4.19
Operators 0.009 1.70 -0.069 -14.46 -0.029 -6.89 -0.072 -12.70 -0.038 -4.92 -0.030 -3.94
Unemployed 0.036 10.16 0.095 30.62 0.083 31.60 0.029 6.65 0.016 3.67 -0.003 -0.85
Married -0.020 -5.51 -0.007 -2.20 -0.039 -11.16 -0.037 -9.85 -0.034 -8.78 -0.022 -5.55
Crime in the area -0.008 -2.18 0.015 5.85 -0.003 -1.35 0.016 4.20 0.007 1.13 -0.007 -1.74
Job mobility 0.088 5.70 -0.018 -2.00 0.068 7.49 -0.010 -0.86 0.083 5.77 0.103 11.46
R-squared 0.196 0.242 0.291 0.219 0.179 0.255 
Sample size 19,211 46,708 39,741 34,598 18,907 12,552 
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